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VIEW FROM PRACTICE
Making the transition from pilot to scale: examining sustainability and
scalability issues in a public-private telecenter partnership in Sri Lanka
Laura Hosman*
Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL, USA

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly the vehicles of choice for the
implementation of information and communications technology in the developing world.
This is particularly true with regard to locally appropriate, shared-access models such as
the telecenter franchise. However, the sustainability and the scalability of such initiatives
remain in question. This article examines an innovative PPP project at a crucial
developmental point: the period of transition from pilot to scaling stage. It identifies
challenges and success factors seldom covered in the literature on such projects, then
addresses the question(s) of sustainability and scalability, and explores the advantages of
focussing on sub-urban areas and the small-and-medium-enterprise sector of emerging
econormes.
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1. Introduction

The bringing of information and communications technology (len benefits to the underserved
developing world has been greatly furthered by the past decade's veritable explosion of
communication technology deployments. Shared-access models - information kiosks, telecen
ters, and Internet cafes - shift the burdens and the costs associated with new technologies from
the individual to businesses, communities, or the government (Salvador, Sherry, & Urrutia,
2005). Outlays for equipment, infrastructure, and connectivity, as well as the investments of
time and effort necessary to gain the expertise to make things work (and then work together),
can be prohibitively high for individuals; the shared-access model represents an efficient
approach for distributing and/or spreading these costs. Governments and agencies responsible
for development quickly recognized the benefits of this model and began to fund deployments
based upon what has now become known as the telecenter movement (Roman & Colle, 2002).
The telecenter movement was donor-driven at its inception: development organizations,
governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) allocated billions of dollars to
fund projects. Yet, as the initial flow of donor funds slowed to a trickle and telecenters
began to fail, it became apparent that the model was either ill-conceived - the design was
faulty - for long-term financial sustainability and/or profitability, or the design was being
poorly executed. In response, an alternate business plan was sought for the shared-access model.
The public-private partnership (PPP)- which ideally takes advantage of both the financial
capital, profit motive, and technological expertise of the private partner and the public partner's
drive to improve citizens' quality of life and reduce the risk involved for the private partner's
financial outlay - was widely considered to be a promising solution. Such multi-actor PPPs,
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formed to achieve goals not realizable by a single party acting alone, are currently held in high
esteem by those seeking ICT-oriented solutions to development challenges. Promoted by gov
ernments, international NGOs, and private firms alike, these partnerships enjoy extensive
support. In fact, the United Nations Millennium Declaration specifically recommends their cre
ation to "ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communi
cations technologies ... are available to all" (Weigel & Waldburger, 2004, p. XV).
PPPs are not, however, a proven panacea for technology-related development projects. There
have been many unsuccessful initiatives (Angerer & Hammerschmid, 2005), and, in addition,
many failed cases go unreported. The search for sustainable models continues; the impact of
any technology-related development project depends on its long-term viability, and stakes are
high in the developing world - funds for development projects of any kind are scarce.
Because of this capital scarcity, most telecenter projects and PPPs begin as pilot programs. A
proof-of-concept trial makes sense from an investor's point of view: successful pilots encourage
further and increased investment. However, the lack of a proven business model for such
projects - coupled with their high failure rate - has prevented the accumulation of significant
literature concerning their sustainability or scalability (Roman & Colle, 2005; Walsham
& Sahay, 2005). This article addresses these issues in the context of the transition from success
ful pilot to scaled project.
The study presented involves firsthand evidence from EasySeva, an innovative, franchise
model Sri Lankan telecenter project involving both local and international partners. The
project is unusual: it employs a unique partial-venture capital-type business model, has demon
strated sufficient promise and/or success at the pilot stage to obtain additional funding for
scaling and promotes SME development in the wider Sri Lankan economy. The fieldwork
informing the article was carried out at a unique point in time: the transition between pilot
completion and project scaling. The examination of such a case is valuable, as numerous
issues present themselves at this crucial stage.
This article provides an in-depth examination of the features and the best practices of the
pilot stage at completion, based on fieldwork observation, surveys, and interviews. It also
addresses lessons learned and incorporated into the project's design and implementation that
have contributed to its initial success and brings up further challenges to be addressed in the
project's next stage.
Following this introduction is a discussion of sustainability and scalability within the context of
PPPs and ICT-and-development and the importance of small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) for the promotion ofnationwide economic development. After this, there is a brief descrip
tion of the fieldwork research methods used, followed by the case study of EasySeva in Sri Lanka.
Subsequent to the case study is a presentation and a discussion of best practices, lessons learned,
and implications for development germane to this and other ICT-and-development projects,
particularly as they face the scaling process.

2. Sustainability and scalability
The numerous benefits of public-private cooperation have placed the resulting partnerships in
the forefront of methods for bringing technology efficiently to underserved areas. Yet, in order to
realize the full, long-term benefits a technology can bring -its incorporation into the lives of a
population - project sustainability and scalability must be considered of paramount importance.
As stated above, ICT-related development projects generally begin life as pilots. While they
serve a valuable function in their specific introduction locales, projects that can be sustainably
expanded and scaled are highly valued for their ability to ensure maximum benefit for the
greatest number of people by taking advantage of economies of scale. However, sustainability

can only be achieved if the (targeted) population realizes a benefit from technology sufficiently
relevant to their lives to engender long-term adoption and integration. Additionally, since PPPs
are business ventures, sustainability also requires profitability for the private partner(s).
Much remains to be learned about the operation of the public-private model; systematic
evaluation is made difficult by the uncoordinated dynamics of the partnerships. There is no
central organizing body, projects may be impossible to compare on a global scale, and standard
metrics for assessment do not exist - perhaps due, in part, to the resistance to evaluation
processes in general (Rosenau, 1999). Further, projects are seldom benchmarked prior to
commencement and the cost of long-term evaluation is often not provided for in the overall
budget (even though doing so has subsequently been identified as a best practice). As such,
the academic community reports, at best, mixed results for such undertakings (London &
Hart, 2004; Van Rensburg, Veldsman, & Jenkins, 2008).
One major concern regarding developing world PPPs is that they do not address the larger
issues of socio-economic development and poverty eradication if they are not sustainable or
relevant to the daily lives of their intended beneficiaries. Kanungo (2004) reports that private
sector participation in such projects has not demonstrated better results than previous public
sector-only initiatives. Regardless, this article will assert that when public-private initiatives
are well thought out, technologically appropriate, and designed with long-term sustainability
and local empowerment in mind, they have the potential to enable real socio-economic progress.
Of course, for an ICT project to succeed at all, it must succeed locally. As such, locally
appropriate technology - that which suits the wants and the needs of intended recipients as
well as the physical, geographical, and/or infrastructural reality - must be deployed. Since
the Sri Lankan (local language) literacy rate is 91%, a telecenter deployment involving Internet
use is locally appropriate (although local content remains less abundant). The high literacy
rate bodes well for Internet uptake and adoption in general, as many advanced technology
applications - such as email and information gathering - require the ability to read and write
(Cecchini & Scott, 2003; Warschauer, 2002). In this respect, Sri Lankans are better poised to
realize ICT-related benefits than many other developing countries' populations; expectations
for this project appear to be in line with the goals of the project detailed in this article. Sri
Lanka's physical infrastructure is appropriate for such a project as well: a liberalized, competi
tive telecom sector provides nationwide service; there is dependable and affordable electricity;
paved roads reach most areas in the country. Even so, the majority of Sri Lankans cannot yet
afford to have computers and broadband Internet connections in their homes or on an individual
basis. When combined, these features facilitate deployment of a statewide, shared-access
telecenter project.
The case presented here evidences both of the success factors - sustainability and scalability
- identified above. It already employs a number of best practices identified in the literature. For
example, its franchising model is recognized as a proven and effective telecenter strategy
(Proenza, 2001). EasySeva's business model and plan were co-designed by Sri Lankans,
while project management and day-to-day operations are carried out by Sri Lankans (Kimaro
& Nhampossa, 2005). As a method for adding value to its offerings, EasySeva differentiates
its services from those of competitors, promotes revenue generation, and focusses on providing
services of multiple kinds (Jensen, 2005). It is simultaneously driven by and actively promoting
domestic entrepreneurship (Kusakabe, 2005), while building local capacity. (For example, the
EasySeva staff trains local telecenter owners to handle smaller technical issues on their own.)
Finally, it promotes new methods for doing business -most notably, networking -locally.
An additional point worth noting is that this project focusses on peri-urban areas of Sri
Lanka. While academics and development experts often emphasize the importance of ICTs in
aiding socio-economic development for the poorest of the poor, we assert that there is both

logic and value in bringing technology to mid-sized cities in developing world countries, at least
at the outset of projects. Rogers and Shukla (2001) specifically identify public access telecenters
as building blocks of an informatization strategy that can help countries with the process of over
coming the digital divide. However, according to Rogers' (1962) widely cited and utilized diffu
sion of innovations model, innovations are adopted according to the logic of an s-shaped curve in
industrialized nations such as those in North America and Europe. This model shows that tech
nological innovations such as the Internet first spread to those most able to take advantage of and
realize benefit from them, then progress to adoption by a critical mass of users and only later
spread to the poor, disadvantaged, and rural residents (Rogers & Shukla, 2001).1t would be illo
gical to expect diffusion of innovation to follow a different path in developing countries - that
technology adoption would be realized by rural and poor residents before reaching a critical
mass in urban and peri-urban areas.
Thus, in the shorter term, it is realistic to pursue strategies that emphasize technology adop
tion by a "critical mass" of users. As Rogers and Shukla (2001, p. 4) assert, "the rate of adoption
of telecenters today is in the take-off portion of the S-curve, which means that the total number
of telecenters is rapidly increasing, and that further diffusion is becoming almost self-sustain
ing." If telecenters are to be profitable in the long term - or sustainable, as we have defined
it above - it is logical that they must locate themselves in the shorter term where there is
"low-hanging fruit" (in other words, where demand is present and even high). We thus identify
EasySeva's pilot-stage focus on peri-urban areas as a best practice.
The EasySeva project boasts multiple potential private-sector benefits for Sri Lanka, among
them the promotion of SMEs in the business sector, the introduction ofnew business methods, an
increase in Internet availability, and the provision of new online services. The project's unique
partnership resembles a venture capital model, though, as the partner providing start-up funding
is a public entity, the investment funds are not repaid. In this model, the public partner provides
the initial funds enabling the project to progress from inception to completion of the pilot 
proof of concept - stage. At that point, public monies stop; the private partners are expected
to take over funding responsibilities as the project scales. Because the project becomes
(mainly) a private-sector concern, its success depends upon its financial sustainability; this
was part of the project's design from the outset. The business model was designed to be
scaled and expanded to a nationwide and even international level, even while encouraging
local entrepreneurship, and has already been recognized as successful by its private corporate
partners (Dialog Telekom and Qualcomm) in terms of reinvestment for expansion, and as
such, has begun the process of scaling across the country.

3. ICT and the SME sector
The concept of microfinance - making small loans to poor entrepreneurs in developing
countries - has received a great deal of public attention and support. Yet, microfinance tends
to support individual, or survival, entrepreneurs; such individualized investments do not, in
fact, contribute substantially to the building of a diversified economy. One of the economic chal
lenges facing developing country economies is a "missing middle" (Kauffmann, 2005). This
term describes an economy consisting of both micro- and macro-sized participants (often domi
nated by foreign-based multinationals) but lacking a robust sector of SMEs.
The important SME sector has the potential to contribute to a country's economy through job
creation, public and private revenue generation, and overall economic competitiveness. In devel
oped countries, SMEs provide more than 60% ofprivate sector employment and are the principal
creators of new jobs (de Ferranti & Ody, 2007; Surowiecki, 2008), so their absence in develop
ing country economies can signal underemployment, as well as a business environment in which

revenue generation, competition, and innovation are all underdeveloped. The SME sector has the
potential to contribute to national economic development strategies by facilitating flows ofinfor
mation, capital, ideas, people, and products (Alampay, 2007).
SMEs can also serve as seedbeds ofinnovation (de Ferranti & Ody, 2007). The use of ICT by
SMEs has the potential to increase efficiency, reduce costs, and broaden market reach (Alampay,
2007). However, ICTs are less likely to be adopted by SMEs when the overall business climate is
not transparent and dependable, or where there is no competition. In the EasySeva case, ICT is
part and parcel of the business being practiced, so the adoption of it or switching to it from other
forms of doing business is not the main issue. However, the EasySeva centers will provide ICT
capabilities - comprising the physical hardware, as well as training and skills development - to
their local communities, so it remains to be seen whether their service offerings will help to
promote ICT uptake and adoption on a wider scale, including by local small businesses.
One of the main obstacles identified in the literature and by SME entrepreneurs in the inter
views is the lack of access to finance capital (de Ferranti & Ody, 2007; Kauffmann, 2005;
Newberry, 2006). In the case presented here, the local finance partner has proven to be the
most problematic project stakeholder. At a certain point, it became clear that this partner was
far more interested in processing loans of much larger amounts than the individual telecenter
entrepreneurs required and simply placed the processing of smaller loans on hold, requiring a
great deal of effort on the part of the EasySeva staff to follow-up on the smaller, telecenter
sized loans. Thus, at the time of the fieldwork research, all of the current EasySeva partners
stood ready to expand the project - corporate funding in place and employees and entrepreneurs
ready to move forward - but the momentum was temporarily stalled by the local finance partner.
This reality is in line with the challenges identified in the literature and highlights the impor
tance of starting at the pilot level and being flexible in terms of which partners will continue as
the project progresses - although in this case, there may not be an alternative. Though it may
seem cart before the horse, it will likely take the presence of a healthy small-and-medium-enter
prise sector within a national economy to encourage the development of local finance institutions
aimed at serving SMEs' needs. Because there are currently few SME-targeted development
interventions, the lack of finance options remains a challenge. However, as recognition of the
"missing middle" problem grows, so too may attempts to ameliorate it. Surowiecki (2008)
reports that some progress is being made: Google.org, the Soros Economic Development
Fund, and the Omidyar Network are setting up a firm in India that will invest only in small
to-medium businesses - a sort of high-profile pilot partnership project formed precisely to
target the ''missing middle."

4. Fieldwork research
This article employs a qualitative, case-study methodology. This methodology is particularly
relevant for researchers examining strategies in emerging economies, as it allows researchers
to examine the process and project intensively. There is not (yet) a theoretical framework that
focusses specifically on public-private or international partnerships (Stewart & Gray, 2006).
Since it is beyond the scope of this article to propose such a framework, our focus will
remain on the case at hand, to identify best practices and to enumerate issues - not previously
identified in the literature - that will become increasingly relevant as similar projects begin to
scale.
The research findings presented herein are based on a combination of field methods such as
interviews, surveys, participant observation, and interaction. The fieldwork took place between
January and February 2008. The findings consist of interviews with the owners of the EasySeva
franchises and the results of a 38-question survey given to customers at the centers and to

customers at the adjacent Dialog Telekom stores. Multiple interviews also took place with the
EasySeva project director, managers, and staff in a period spanning the entire duration of the
fieldwork.
At the time of research, there were 18 EasySeva centers operational. Interviews were con
ducted with nine (or half) of the franchise owners during visits to their stores. There were 96
completed surveys in total, with as representative a sample as possible coming from each of
the centers visited. The customer surveys were available in both Sinhalese and English (and
were translated into Tamil in a few cases). The interviews were conducted in English. EasySeva
staff provided assistance with both interpretation (when needed) and translation.

5. Case study: EasySeva
EasySeva (or Easy Service in the local languages) is a for-profit franchise service center project
to bring affordable broadband wireless telecommunications and Internet technology to under
served areas of Sri Lanka. It is a PPP comprising multiple local and international partners
from numerous sectors of relevant industries. The aim of the EasySeva project is to empower
communities across Sri Lanka to improve their quality of life and economic status through
the use of ICT (Synergy Strategies Group [SSG], 2007).
The EasySeva business strategy is built on a franchising model. Local entrepreneurs 
generally those already employed in founding partner Dialog Telekom's mobile phone
stores - are identified, interviewed, and recruited to establish village-level EasySeva telecen
ter franchises that provide the local population with Internet and telephone access, as well as
many Internet-enabled services. Potential franchisees each start their business by purchasing a
"Center-in-a-box," which consists of four reconditioned personal computers with a licensed
suite of Microsoft Office products, an ali-in-one printer/copier/fax machine, and a broadband
connection via Dialog Telekom, a leading telecom service provider in Sri Lanka (SSG,
2007).
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In addition to the equipment, setup, and connectivity, the franchise package includes information
technology (IT)/business training, business plan support, a micro-loan and lease program, mar
keting support, and a 24/7 help desk. The majority of these items and services are provided
directly by EasySeva partners. The project benefits from economy of scale: by buying in
bulk, it is able to provide technology, support, and prices/rates well below those which any
single operator, entrepreneur, or company could negotiate by itself. Additionally, the franchi
see's required capital outlay (obtained through a start-up loan) reduces the up-front costs for
the main project partner, SSG (2007).
While EasySeva provides kiosk owners with training, support, technical assistance, and
access to financial assistance they otherwise would not have, in the end, the local franchise
owners themselves are responsible for generating the income to repay their initialloan(s) in a
timely fashion (30 months). In other words, they are responsible for putting into practice the
marketing strategies they learn as part of their assistance and for developing additional

product and service offerings of their own. This is intended to challenge and stimulate the
creative, entrepreneurial spirit.
The implementing partner of the EasySeva project is SSG, a small, Vermont-based
American finn. In the summer of 2006, SSG beat out a considerable number of established
competitors for a United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-sponsored
Last Mile Initiative (LMI) grant. LMI, launched in 2003, is USAID's global program to bring
modem telecommunications infrastructure to underserved areas.
In the Sri Lanka LMI, USAID stipulated a number of project requirements with an eye to
promoting long-term sustainability. Among these was 2-to-1 matching of project funds: every
dollar provided by USAID had to be matched by the private sector partner by $0.50 of either
its own or partner's funds. In order to promote project scalability, USAID required that a
minimum of 20 centers had to be fully operational within 1 year of the project award date, to
ensure a "proof of concept" for scalability. In addition, USAID encouraged and facilitated
SSG' s forming of alliances with both public and private sector partners.
At the end of September 2006, SSG was awarded the contract and began implementation,
partnering with numerous organizations. The partners, as well as their status as local or
foreign-based, for-profit or not for profit, are detailed in Table 1. It is worth noting that the
majority of partners are Sri Lankan.
From the beginning, SSG viewed this project as a scalable business development opportu
nity. The USAID funds were utilized to enable the pilot project's deployment. After that
stage, sufficient private financing needed to be attracted. This meant that current partners had
to realize a profit to remain involved and, in addition, to expand their involvement as the
project scaled (SSG, 2007). Growth in involvement was demonstrated by the time of the field
work - corporate partners Qualcomm and Dialog Telekom had increased their initial levels of
investment/ stake in the project and, by doing so, provided the necessary financing for the scaling
process. Not only does this business model provide SSG a true long-term stake in the project, it
also creates incentives for contracted partners to realize profitability as well, promoting desire
for continued participation in the project's expansion.
All of these characteristics contribute to the potential for the project's long-term sustainabil
ity. Figure 1 is intended to capture the main ideas of the PPP in visual format. At the very center
are the dual goals of sustainability and scalability. The public and private partners, as described
above, each bring their own specializations and incentives (including funding, risk-sharing, tech
nological expertise, new business methods, strategies and services, etc.) to the table in order to
realize the unique business model that is the PPP, while the EasySeva franchisee gains at the
individual level from technological expertise and socio-economic development, while at the
same time, through his or her business, contributes at the local, regional, and even national
level, as he or she provides technology services and helps develop the SME sector of the
economy.

Table l. EasySeva partnerships.
Private partners

Public partners

SSG - EasySeva
Dialog Telekom
Qualcomm8
LOLC (financier)
Technology hardware provider

USAIDa
InfoShare (NGO)
National Development Bank of Sri Lanka

8

Non-Sri Lankan partners

Figure 1. The EasySeva PPP.

The Facilitator Partner provides both start-up funding and the goal of promoting socio-econ
omic development. However, its role is far more complex than this: in EasySeva's case, USAID
played the facilitating actor, providing the impetus for the project, the call for proposals, the seed
funding, and then acted as a matchmaker of sorts, to introduce the winning company to local
for-profit and not-for-profit contacts on the ground. As stated above, this PPP model is innova
tive in that it resembles the venture capital model: the Facilitator provides seed money and con
tacts to get the pilot off to a promising start, but it sets an end-date for its own project
involvement, after which time the built-in longer-term incentives kick in, which have been
designed to promote the project's sustainability and scalability in the long run. In fact, such
incentivizing represents a rather recent, and certainly radical, departure for USAID: tradition
ally, US firms merely extracted aid fees from the initial implementation of a project and had
little-to-no interest in the impact or sustainability of the project after deployment. This PPP
Facilitator approach with appropriate incentives built in is designed to turn the previous
extract-then-exit model on its head.
Aid organizations have begun to assume this vital, time-limited facilitator/leader role in a
number of telecommunications-related PPP projects across the developing world (for
additional cases, see, e.g. Hosman, 2010; Hosman, Fife, & Armey, 2008). The project facil
itator role need not be an aid organization however; it could be an NGO or government itself
that designs a project, formulates incentives, provides seed funding, and sets an end-date for
funding and involvement; all with project sustainability at the forefront. This performance
based contract model marks a shift on the part of USAID, which now recognizes that
correct incentives must be in place for aid-based funding to be effective; a project is
more likely to be a success when all parties have a stake (often a financial one) in the
outcome.
SSG - the US-based contract awardee - registered its new company EasySeva, the franchi
sor, as a Sri Lankan Private company in early 2007. As mentioned above, fieldwork took place at
the completion of the pilot stage in January/February 2008. At the time of this article's writing,
the number ofcenters had nearly doubled from 18 to 35 in <4 months. The company intended to

open 400-500 centers within Sri Lanka over the next 3-4 years, with an additionallOOO centers
around the South Asian region planned for the future.

6. What was learned? Success factors, lessons learned, and implications for
development
The following section provides an overview and discussion of findings from firsthand research
undertaken on the EasySeva project during the transition period from pilot to scale. Challenges,
lessons learned, and success factors are highlighted, and potential implications for development,
where relevant, are discussed.
6.1 Finding the right project partners is essential
In addition to providing a proof of concept to promote additional investment, there are numerous
other reasons why starting small can be valuable. The pilot stage gives project leaders the oppor
tunity to ascertain which partners are truly committed to the project's long-term survival; those
that are not can be replaced, if possible. Alternately, incentives can be adjusted to inspire greater
partner commitment. In EasySeva's case, there were challenges early on with the local hardware
equipment provider. This partner was easily replaced, as numerous other local businesses
perform the same service. However, there also have been ongoing challenges with the local
financing partner, which is less simple to replace. Due to the lack of financing alternatives
described above, there are few, ifany, Sri Lankan alternatives to provide local, small-scale finan
cing for individual entrepreneurs. Thus, the project has had to work with the same less-than-ideal
company, though replacement would have increased efficiency. At the time of research, inaction
by the local finance partner was slowing the project's scaling.
6.2 Initial focus on low-hanging fruit while gradually introducing new value-adding

services
6.2.1

Customer service

At the time the surveys were administered, Internet and email comprised the most frequently
utilized applications at the centers, with 78 and 46% of the respondents reporting use of
these, respectively. However, in order to differentiate its offerings from those of other Internet
cafes, EasySeva is focussed on service orientation as a means of providing added value to its
customers. For example, person-to-person customer service enables clients to feel comfortable
going in to the center and asking for help with technology. Customer service seemed to be uni
versally - and uniformly - carried out in the centers; employees appeared ready to help custo
mers with anything they knew how to do, and in the surveys, customers unanimously reported
satisfaction with their experience(s). Interviews conducted with center owners also singled this
out as an area in which EasySeva differs from other telecenter businesses. Thus, distinguishing a
business from potential competition- in this case as a "service center," as opposed to simply a
telecenter or Internet cafe that does little beyond providing computers with a connection to the
Internet - may be identified as a best practice that becomes increasingly relevant as a project
starts to scale.
Owner satisfaction was uniformly positive as well: when asked directly, "Are you satisfied
(so far) with EasySeva?" each answered in the affirmative. It may be worth noting that the unan
imous satisfaction rate evident in the survey is even more robust than those from the interviews,
as the surveys were anonymous in nature, while the interviewees had to answer directly to the
researcher - and often in front of an EasySeva employee. Centers also appear to be conveniently

located and to have opening hours of operation convenient for customers; positive survey
responses to each of the above questions rated over 95%.
An additional aspect of the "low-hanging fruit" concept includes EasySeva's pilot-stage
focus on peri-urban areas, to target those regions and populations where a critical mass of
people already exists who are aware of uses of computers and the Internet, but who are
unable to afford this technology or connectivity on an individual basis. This best practice was
mentioned above and is discussed in further detail below.

6.2.2

Innovative online services

Another form of value-adding is to provide innovative online services either not yet available
elsewhere, or, if available, at a more competitive rate. Planned services unique to EasySeva
include the following: online banking, money transfer, loan applications, bill payment, appoint
ment booking, technical skills courses, and small-group training. The fact that EasySeva is
developing and offering these services eventually will be a distinct value-add for the Sri
Lankan population in general (and for EasySeva customers in particular); such services likely
would not be developed and offered as quickly on a nationwide basis without a coordinated
effort such as that of EasySeva. This represents an important additional business strategy for
EasySeva: differentiating itself from other telecenters.
At the completion of the pilot stage, a number of anticipated service offerings were not yet
available. Some of these services have since come online. One in particular, International Direct
Dial calling, is a valuable service, as the Sri Lankan expatriate workforce is extremely large.
While estimates vary, in 1999, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka estimated that there were over
788 million expatriate workers, 90% of whom are employed in the Middle East (Central
Bank of Sri Lanka, 1999; this statistic is no longer officially reported). Given the high rate of
depression and even suicide among these workers (Toumi, 2007), affordable overseas communi
cation may truly be said to provide a "lifeline" between loved ones. Another coming service
anticipated by rural inhabitants is the ability to make doctor appointments and arrange hospital
visits in the capital city of Colombo, where major hospitals and specialists are located. People
will also be able to receive paperwork regarding these appointments over the Internet. These
services will save time and the travel costs of multiple journeys to distant hospitals.

6.2.3

Services not available on mobile phones

As a general point, telecenter projects will need to focus their business strategy to provide
services not provided by mobile phones, which are becoming ubiquitous across the developing
world. Since 90% of the respondents to the survey distributed at the EasySeva centers reported
that they owned mobile phones, it will be important for EasySeva to provide services not readily
available over mobiles; this will hold true for telecenter initiatives across the developing world.
At the same time, while the majority of Sri Lankans cannot yet afford to have computers with
broadband Internet connections in their homes, most - 80% of the survey respondents - are
aware of the Internet, so there is a large potential customer base.

6.2.4

New ways of doing business: networking among franchise owners

New ways of doing business made possible by the scaling process rarely receive mention in the
literature, as they are not yet relevant at the pilot stage. Networking among entrepreneurs, a good
example of this, is useful for the sharing of innovative ideas, challenges - and their solutions 
with others in the same situation in a collegial, noncompetitive environment. In fact, the more

information shared, the stronger the network and the better the chances of success for all; this is a
principal advantage of the franchising model. While this type of networking is not yet part of the
business mindset in Sri Lanka, a few weeks after the fieldwork was carried out, EasySeva began
actively promoting entrepreneur networking at regularly scheduled workshops. These work
shops - where numerous business-promoting concepts are covered - provide the opportunity
for owners to meet in person, build levels of interpersonal trust, and counter the perception of
competition. At the time of the interviews (which took place before the workshops), divergent
views were in evidence: some of those working in EasySeva centers did not yet grasp the useful
ness of networking and still viewed other owners as adversaries, while others had already begun
the exchange of ideas and information.
In the future, EasySeva plans to expand workshop offerings to include center employees as
well. At this time, however, there remains a challenge, one that is by no means unique to Easy
Seva: workers who have received (free) IT training often seek higher-paying jobs elsewhere
once their skill levels have increased. Of course, worker retention is a challenge for businesses
of every kind, all over the world.
Table 2 summarizes both the business strategies and the service innovations proposed and
implemented by EasySeva.

6.3 Office staff experience, commitment, and work ethic of crucial importance
Another overall success factor virtually absent from the ICT for development literature is
the importance of the level of experience, motivation, and commitment of the project's
staff. It would be difficult to overstate how central to the success or the failure of any
such project those responsible for its implementation are. Practitioners navigate the interplay
between the top-down and the bottom-up aspects of a project. They are responsible for car
rying out the deployment on a day-to-day basis, reacting when plans do not play out as
anticipated, and formulating alternate methods for moving forward. They frequently work
long hours, motivated by a belief in the project's ability to enable positive change and
foster development.
All of those involved in EasySeva' s design and implementation, including the entire project
management team, had prior experience planning and deploying ICT-for-development projects;
EasySeva benefited significantly from their understanding of what worked and what did not in
the past. This experience facilitated the creation - and continual revision, where necessary - of
EasySeva's plan of action. Firsthand observation and interviews also revealed the staff
members' commitment to and belief in the project, their flexibility in navigating the challenges
that arose, and their willingness to work long hours in order to move the project forward. Further
scholarly review of this crucial aspect of such projects - the practitioners and their vital role in
carrying out project implementation - is certainly warranted.

Table 2. EasySeva business and services innovations.
Business strategies

Innovative online services

In-store customer services
Networking among franchisees
Quarterly workshops/trainings for franchisees
Locally driven promotion and advertising

International direct dial calls at lower rates
Hospital appointments and follow-ups
Online banking and money transfer
Online bill pay (e.g. mobile phone bills)
Technical skills courses
Small group trainings

6.4 Large-scale challenges on the national level
Many of the issues faced by the project practitioners present somewhat of a chicken-and-egg
dilemma. This may be seen most notably with the availability of services and in the aware
ness-raising campaigns. It can be difficult to put innovative services into place without a critical
mass of users, yet it is also difficult to cultivate a critical mass of users for services not yet avail
able. In a similar vein, it is difficult to conceive of a nationwide advertising campaign when just
20 centers exist across the country. On the other hand, the 20 centers that do exist face difficulty
in the early days, if they depend upon the central organization to carry out their publicity.
6.4.1

Publicity and awareness-raising campaigns

These raise a few questions: At what point in the scaling process does it become appropriate to
launch a large-scale, nation-wide publicity campaign? To what degree should the owners be
dependent on the central offices to provide their advertising if they themselves are considered
entrepreneurs? In fact, entrepreneurial drive among owners varied widely. During the inter
views, distinctions between those with visions for the future of their centers and those
without became quite clear, as did those between owners with entrepreneurial drive and those
that simply wanted to run a telecenter. This variance was already noted by the staff during
the pilot stage and should, in fact, change in the future. Better methods of identification and
selection of entrepreneurially minded future center owners were already going into effect at
pilot-stage completion - another example of adjustments being made at the crucial stage
between pilot and scaling.
Marketing and advertising on the EasySeva project, at the time of field research, remained
generally limited. Not many of the owners had yet begun advertising initiatives on their own;
some expected this to be done by the EasySeva headquarters staff. Others, however, had
begun their own publicity initiatives and were seeing demonstrable results. This issue will
need to be clarified and addressed as EasySeva moves forward.
The topics ofpublicity and/or awareness-raising campaigns are rarely addressed in the litera
ture dealing with pilot projects, as they arguably do not become necessary until a project scales.
Yet, if people are not aware of a new technology or how it can benefit them, they are unlikely to
take advantage ofit; this decreases the likelihood ofproject success. Awareness of a project is, in
fact, of importance equal to the availability of innovative services. The services offered by this
project are indisputably original and will be invaluable across the entire country when they
become available. However, a concerted, coordinated nationwide awareness-raising campaign
coinciding with the scaling of the EasySeva project will also be essential. EasySeva could, con
ceivably, capitalize on the existing marketing capabilities of project partner Dialog Telekom.
The capacity to lead or facilitate such a campaign already exists for Dialog Telekom: it is, after
all, one of the nation's leading service providers. Since Dialog Telekom has a financial stake in
the success of the project, it would be in their best interests to work together with EasySeva on
publicity - another example of how partnering provides incentives aligned to the best interests
of the project. At the time of the fieldwork research, there were already plans underway to capi
talize on Dialog Telekom's brand recognition by revising the EasySeva logo to match or become
similar to the nationally recognizable Dialog Telekom E-Z logo.

6.5 Local and regional challenges
Another rarely noted issue concerning pilot projects as yet untried by the challenges of scaling is
that regional differences will dictate local usage patterns in the individual telecenters, and, thus,
how entrepreneurs will need to target or advertise their services. One owner pointed out that in

his area, local schoolchildren did not have enough disposable income to make use of his telecen
ter; this clearly was not the case for other telecenters in which schoolchildren occupied every
available computer. Additionally, in some cities, the EasySeva centers represented the only
public Internet access. In others, there were already multiple Internet cafes with which the Easy
Seva centers needed to compete. These examples underscore the fact that each store owner will
need to design a business plan that is locally appropriate, whether that means raising Internet
awareness in general, or differentiating a center's services from that of a competitor. One
center owner noted that most people who lived in his area were not yet aware of the Internet,
so he will need to focus on raising awareness of how the Internet can be useful. Another
owner competes with a handful of Internet cafes nearby; in response, he has attempted to differ
entiate his center by making it the most modem-looking in the city.

6.6 Societal issues
6.6.1 Involving more females
There is currently a drive to involve more females at the EasySeva centers. Yet, use ofEasySeva
centers by females is still comparatively low. There were fewer female than male customers at
every store visited. Females comprised just 25% of the survey respondents. Many of the center
owners expressed the desire to increase the female customer base, but the means to do so
remained elusive. Two owners mentioned that employing a female in the store helped other
females to feel comfortable coming in to the store and becoming EasySeva customers: hiring
female employees represents one strategy for addressing this issue. However, it is also important
to remember that ICT is always and everywhere introduced into a society, and this society does
not change as quickly as technology might enable it to. There are simply currently not as many
females as males in Sri Lanka who see technology as being relevant or important for their lives.
This may change over time, and, certainly, encouraging females to become involved at the Easy
Seva centers is a step in the right direction for encouraging equality of technology use.
6.6.2

Involving more schoolchildren

Surveys reported use of computers for school-related tasks lower than expected (at 17%),
particularly when comparing these responses with what customers would like to use computers
for (71% of the respondents indicated that they would like to use computers for educational
purposes). Use of EasySeva centers (and of the Internet in general) for educational purposes
will be an important area of future focus - the earlier in life one starts using a technology,
the more likely that technology will be adopted and incorporated into one's activities and its
potential benefits realized. Sri Lanka boasts nearly universal primary education, with a 97%
emolment rate and a 98% retention rate through grade 5. Thus, a case may be made that if
there were more school-related reasons to make use of the EasySeva centers, more females
would come in and become comfortable with technology and begin to see its value as well.
During the interviews, there was just one franchise owner who had made an agreement with a
local school and provided free Internet use to children demonstratably using the service for
school-related assignments.
6.6.3

Local social values can be proactively upheld

On a related note concerning social values, since the EasySeva owners have the prerogative to do
so, they are actively preventing the use of their centers for what are deemed societally negative
purposes. Three of the owners interviewed mentioned that they have stopped customers from

using the computers and the Internet for watching pornography (this may also contribute to
females being more comfortable coming in to the centers).

6.7 SME development: initial focus where demand exists
Finally, as noted above, EasySeva supports and promotes SME private sector development in Sri
Lanka. EasySeva's original business plan had focussed on rural areas of the country, as these
were deemed to have the greatest need. However, as this project is, in the long run, a business
proposition with profitability of paramount importance, the original plan was changed to focus
on medium-sized cities throughout the country, in order to capitalize initially on the "low
hanging fruit" and realize a quick success during the proof-of-concept stage. Medium-sized
cities generally have commercial centers, as well as a population that has attained critical
mass in terms of computer knowledge and Internet awareness. However, most people were
still not able to afford individual ownership of hardware and subscription fees for connectivity.
This approach - of targeting the peri-urban or middle income level population - has been cri
ticized by those concerned with realizing a benefit for the nation's poorest: such a model tends to
benefit mid-size city dwellers and may exacerbate a rural/urban gap. As discussed above, we
believe that the for -profit model associated with PPPs must, in fact, focus its efforts where
they are most likely to realize both short- and long-term profitability, and it may be not until
the scaling stage that more rural areas can be included as potentially profitable locations.
This point, though rarely acknowledged in the literature, is worth making: projects
concerned with ICT for development must not make perfection the enemy of the possible.
There is a need for the realization that helping medium-sized city residents - members of
what may be considered a middle class of a given country - is indeed still helping with the
overall goals of increased economic, social, and information "development."
In addition to general business creation - and the employment of the owners themselves 
most of the EasySeva centers also provide employment to multiple staff employees, thus creat
ing job opportunities while offering valuable services to the community and other local
businesses. Because the project was observed during the period of transition from pilot to
scaling, it is too soon to comment on its outcomes. The degree to which EasySeva will contribute
to small business-promotion across the country will become evident over time as the project
scales. Yet, with 400 centers planned for deployment across the island, the potential for employ
ment generation and technology diffusion, as well as for serving increasingly varied sizes of
communities, is significant.

7. Conclusion
PPPs offer great opportunities for technological advancement in the developing world. Still,
there is a need for careful study of the initiatives for which they are formed, in order to better
understand what makes for successful projects and enable the encouragement of appropriate
use of ICTs to further human development. Sustainability and scalability of these projects
have been identified as important success factors, but, as few pilots have successfully reached
the scaling stage, the opportunity for scholarly analysis has been limited.
This article presented a case study of a PPP designed with scalability and sustainability as
main goals from the very beginning. The project has the potential to promote development in
the SME sector of the Sri Lankan economy. The proof of concept demonstrated at the
completion of the project's pilot stage inspired additional (re)investment funds from EasySeva' s
own private partners. These funds enabled EasySeva to begin the scaling process. Such reinvest
ment clearly signifies confidence and long-term buy-in on behalf of the project partners; it also

demonstrates that the partnership has been effectively designed in terms of the alignment of
stakeholder incentives; this bodes well for the continued success of the project. In terms of
the business model employed, both the franchising aspect and the publicly funded venture
capital design were identified as important success factors for sustainability and scalability.
The fieldwork informing this article was carried out at the seldom-studied transition point
between the completion of the pilot project and the commencement of the project's scaling.
A number of challenges and success factors were identified that are rarely addressed in the
literature, mirroring the fact that since few pilot projects progress to the scaling stage, rarely
do they face the issues associated with its attendant growth and transition. Included among
the topics addressed were as follows: the differentiation of services being offered (that are not
available over mobile phones) and the understanding of how best to promote these locally;
the importance of a marketing campaign to raise awareness of the availability and value of
the new services being offered; the promotion of technology uptake (and service center use)
among females and schoolchildren; the promotion of new ways of doing business - in this
case, networking; and the critical importance of experience and commitment on the part of
the project staff.
The article presented a number of issues that the EasySeva project is successfully addressing,
as well as some challenges that remain. There is great potential for lessons to be learned by other
ICT-related development projects, both from the best practices exhibited and from the chal
lenges encountered in the planning and the implementation stages of the project. This work is
also intended to serve as a baseline, of sorts, as there will be further value in revisiting the
issues addressed above as the project continues to scale.
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